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Abstract
Career concerns provide managers with implicit incentives, which beneﬁt sharehold-
ers. However, these concerns are also costly to shareholders because managers need to
be compensated for career risk. Career risk is especially signiﬁcant if a manager's
perceived ability is largely exposed to the labor market, as it is the case when the
manager is asked to implement innovative strategies. Although lowering the quality
of the information disclosed by the ﬁrm can mitigate a manager's career risk, it also
hinders the manager's eﬀort. This study theoretically examines shareholders decisions
on innovative investments and information quality in the presence of managerial career
concerns. I show that there is a tension between mitigating the career risk resulting
from innovation and motivating managerial eﬀort. I ﬁnd that when the innovation
urgency is intense, shareholders invest more in innovation and lower the information
quality to protect the manager from career risk. In contrast, when the level of innova-
tion urgency is low, shareholders invest less to mitigate the manager's career risk, while
increasing the explicit incentive to motivate higher eﬀort. My results provide possible
explanations for mixed empirical ﬁndings on the relationship between career concerns
and investment. Moreover, my results suggest that when we examine the impact of
career concerns on investments in innovation, disclosure policy and managerial explicit
incentives, we need to consider the innovation urgency. Since innovation urgency is also
an industry-speciﬁc characteristic, my results also shed light on the aforementioned ca-
reer concerns eﬀects across industries. In addition, my results predict that experienced
CEOs may not be favored by extremely innovative or least innovative ﬁrms as much as
by middle-of-the-road innovation ﬁrms.
∗I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my dissertation committee Carlos Corona (chair),
Jing Li, Pierre Jinghong Liang, Lin Nan for their invaluable support and guidance. I also thank Andrew
Bird, Jonathan Glover, Thomas Ruchti, Jack Stecher, and seminar participants at Carnegie Mellon for their
comments. All errors and ambiguities are my responsibility. Ran Zhao is a Ph.D. candidate in accounting
at Carnegie Mellon University. E-mail: ranzhao@andrew.cmu.edu.
1
1 Introduction
Over the past 60 years, innovation-related expenditures have been increasing dramatically,
and become a crucial strategic decision for many ﬁrms. During 1995-2007, U.S. ﬁrms' annual
innovation investments comprised 12.8% of the U.S. GDP, which is more than double the
number during the high-growth period after World War II (1948-1972) (Corrado and Hulten,
2010). March (1991) identiﬁes two forms of innovation: exploitation and exploration. Ex-
ploitation aims at improving the eﬃciency of the current business model, while exploration
seeks to develop new business opportunities. The innovation I examine in this paper, better
characterized as exploration, includes any radical innovation that transforms the ﬁrm, such
as a broad organizational change, a strategic acquisition, entering into new markets, creating
and/or adopting new technologies, etc. Boards of directors often initiate such explorative
innovations when the competitive situation renders an intense urgency for transformation. 1
As pointed out by Kotter (1995), the ﬁrst step in transforming a ﬁrm is cultivating a sense
of urgency, followed by hiring a powerful leader to steer the change (see also Helmich and
Brown, 1972). For example, after years of J.C. Penney's alarming performance, Bill Ackman,
a board member and the largest shareholder, strongly suggested that the board hire Ron
Johnson as CEO because of his remarkable success in Apple's retail operations. Indeed, a
manager's ability is a key factor in undertaking a ﬁrm transformation (Banker et al., 2013).
However, in such endeavors, the manager puts his own future career prospects at great risk.
If the innovation fails, the manager may be considered ineﬀective, lose his job, and dam-
age his reputation. In the J. C. Penney example, the changes that Johnson implemented
caused a dramatic drop in the ﬁrm's revenues. He was shortly ousted and, since then, he
has not been reported to have taken an executive job. In contrast, CEOs of ﬁrms with a
clear deﬁciency in innovation, such as GE and CISCO, are still at the helm even though
their ﬁrms have been losing proﬁts for years (Hartung, 2012). In this sense, managers that
are asked to implement innovations bear a higher career risk than those simply adopting an
inconspicuous stewardship role. Moreover, managers' career risk needs to be appropriately
compensated. Therefore, shareholders must take into account managerial career risk when
they make decisions to innovate.
The empirical evidence regarding the relation between CEO career concerns and ﬁrm
investment decisions is mixed.2 Some studies ﬁnd that ﬁrms' investment decreases with the
1The innovation urgency is diﬀerent among ﬁrms, depending on the prevailing and potential crises and
opportunities. For example, ﬁrms with recessive performances are desperate to make radical transformations
to survive (Greve, 1998); ﬁrms facing rapid market shifts should also change business practices to adapt to
the market environment; high-tech ﬁrms need to make constant innovations to maintain their reputation
and maintain a competitive advantage.
2In previous studies, it is a common perception that the degree of career concern is negatively related
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degree of managers' career concerns. For example, Pan et al. (2013) empirically ﬁnd that
ﬁrms with CEOs in their early tenure tend to disinvest and, later on, increase investments
as the CEOs tenures extend. In contrast, Serﬂing (2012) ﬁnds that ﬁrms with younger
CEOs invest more than those with older CEOs, but this evidence is only signiﬁcant for high-
growth industries. This seemingly contradicting evidence suggests that deeper insight into
the interaction between managerial career concerns and innovation is needed. Moreover,
although it may appear unrelated, career concerns also have an important inﬂuence on
ﬁnancial statement practices. Indeed, in a survey conducted by Graham et. al., (2005) more
than three quarters of the managers admitted to have a strong incentive to meet earnings
benchmarks due to reputation concerns rather than short-term compensation. In this sense,
ﬁnancial statement practices aﬀect manager exposure to career concerns and, therefore, must
also aﬀect innovative investment decisions. The aforementioned evidence indicates that there
seems to be a relation between managerial career concerns and shareholders decisions on both
innovation investment and ﬁnancial information quality that deserves further examination.
In this study, I develop an analytical model to examine how shareholders jointly make
decisions on innovation and information quality in the presence of managerial career concerns.
I assume that shareholders are risk-neutral and endowed with a level of innovation urgency,
such as developing opportunities to gain a competitive advantage, resolving a current or
potential crisis, etc. Depending on the innovation urgency, shareholders decide the extent
to which changes are undertaken in the ﬁrm's business. The more the shareholders want to
change, the more they invest. Moreover, shareholders need to hire a manager to implement
such innovation. The innovative investment outcome depends on the manager's ability
more so when the change is large. In addition, the manager is risk-averse and can improve
the outcome with a costly eﬀort that is not publicly observable. This eﬀort can be thought
of as an operating eﬀort in maintaining routine business. Shareholders oﬀer a contract to the
manager to motivate his operating eﬀort and compensate him for career risk. In addition,
shareholders can also choose the quality of accounting information. The lower the level of
information quality, the less weight the labor market puts on the public signal when assessing
the manager's ability and, therefore, the lower the manager's career risk. However, this also
induces a noisier performance measure, thereby making motivation of the manager's eﬀort
more diﬃcult. Together, the model determines the shareholders jointly optimal decisions
on innovation, information quality, and compensation contract taking into consideration the
manager's career risk.
I show that shareholders prefer imperfect information in order to protect the manager
from career risk, especially when the innovative investment is large. I ﬁnd that innovation
with CEO age and tenure.
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urgency plays a critical role in determining the way shareholders cope with career concerns.
When innovation urgency is intense, shareholders invest heavily and choose a low level of
information quality to reduce the manager's exposure to career risk. At high levels of in-
novation and low levels of information quality, the outcome is very volatile and, therefore,
motivating eﬀort is very costly. However, innovation investment is inexpensive because the
manager is hardly exposed to the labor market. This yields an unexpected result: the more
concerned the manager is about his career prospects (e.g., the less is known about the man-
ager's ability), the more shareholders invest in innovation. In contrast, when the level of
innovation urgency is low, shareholders invest less to mitigate the manager's career risk,
and focus on motivating the manager's eﬀort with high levels of information quality and
strong compensation incentives. At high levels of information quality, innovation investment
is costly because it exposes the manager's ability conspicuously, whereas motivating the op-
erating eﬀort with explicit incentives is more eﬃcient. This produces another unexpected
result: an increase in the manager career-risk concerns induces shareholders to increase the
power of explicit compensation incentives. Indeed, higher managerial career-risk concerns
shift shareholders focus towards the operating eﬀort even further. As a result, shareholders
reduce innovative investment, increase information quality, and increase explicit incentives.
In addition, I ﬁnd that shareholders preferences over managerial degree of career concerns
are not monotonic in the urgency of innovation. In fact, in ﬁrms with intermediate levels
of innovation urgency, managerial career concerns are most detrimental to shareholders. In-
deed, in these ﬁrms, stronger career concerns result in both lower innovative investment and
managerial eﬀort. Therefore, these ﬁrms value an experienced manager most because his
ability is well known and, as a result, the manager is less concerned about being exposed to
the labor market. Through a numerical example in a matching model, I show that managers
with fewer career concerns, such as experienced managers, are most favored by middle-of-
the-road innovation ﬁrms. In summary, I show that innovation urgency is critical in the
relation between managerial career concerns and shareholders decisions on innovation, dis-
closure policy, managerial compensation, as well as manager selection. Moreover, the impact
of innovation urgency on these relations is non-monotonic. Because innovation urgency is
also an industry-speciﬁc characteristic, my results shed light on cross-industry studies on the
impact of career concerns on ﬁrms investment and managerial compensation decisions.
My study sheds light on the mixed evidence in the literature with respect to the re-
lationship between CEO career concerns and ﬁrm investment decisions. The ﬁnding of a
non-monotonic relationship between career concerns and innovative investment is supported
by the empirical evidence by Serﬂing (2012). Existing studies theoretically examining the
link between a ﬁrm's investment decision and career concerns are scattered. Holmstrom and
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Ricart i Costa (1986) show that career concerns induce a manager to underinvest in projects
with returns contingent on his ability, and the distortion in investment decisions cannot be
completely addressed with a compensation contract. Zwiebel (1995) and Prendergast and
Stole (1996) consider a setting in which the manager has private information about his abil-
ity. Zwiebel (1995) shows that if the labor market assesses managers abilities based on their
relative performance, managers may have an incentive to undertake innovative paths in or-
der to avoid such comparison, therefore making their evaluation less accurate and less risky.
Prendergast and Stole (1996) demonstrate that in order to signal high ability, managers may
overweigh their private information in making investment decisions at the early stage but
may ultimately become too conservative. In contrast to these papers, I focus on the tradeoﬀ
shareholders face in taking decisions on innovation investment, information quality as devices
to motivate eﬀort and mitigate the manager's career risk in a setting with no information
asymmetry about the manager's ability.
My study also contributes to the broad literature on the eﬀect of career concerns on
managers' compensation. Holmstrom (1999) shows that career concerns may beneﬁt share-
holders by providing implicit incentives that motivate managerial eﬀort by linking managerial
performance to future wages. Gibbons and Murphy (1992) argue that career concerns can
actually substitute for explicit incentives in motivating managerial eﬀort (henceforth, the
substitution eﬀect). However, Chen and Jiang (2006) suggest that the substitution eﬀect
may be weakened or even reversed by considering the case in which a manager can control the
informativeness of the report about his ability. Autrey et al. (2003, 2006) examine the role
of career concerns on incentive provision considering the availability of two signals, a public
signal and a private signal. My study suggests that in addition to the direct substitution ef-
fect between career concerns and the explicit incentive, career concerns also interact with the
compensation contract indirectly through a ﬁrm's innovation. Speciﬁcally, I ﬁnd that when
the level of innovation urgency is low, shareholders decrease innovation as career concerns
increase; therefore, the business becomes relatively stable and motivating managerial eﬀort
is more eﬃcient. As a result, my result predicts that managers' pay-performance-sensitivity
increases with career concerns if the level of innovation urgency is low.
My study is also related to the literature on the relationship between career concerns and
information quality. There is a line of literature that focuses on the role of career concerns
in motivating managerial eﬀort in diﬀerent information environments. Dewatripont et al.
(1999a) compare the diﬀerent roles of career concerns incentives within various information
structures. Arya and Mittendorf (2011), building upon Dewatripont et al. (1999a), study
a multi-agent model and compare the aggregated and disaggregated performance measures
with the existence of career concerns. There is another line of literature that implies that
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a less transparent information environment may be good for shareholders in the sense of
reducing manager career risk, which must be compensated ex-ante by the shareholders (as
seen in Hermalin and Weisbach, 2007). Arya, Glover, and Sunder (1998) show that allowing
earnings manipulation will reduce the frequency of management turnover. Therefore, share-
holders save ex-ante compensation for managers' dismissal risk. In my study, I examine
the tension that shareholders face between reducing information quality to protect the man-
ager from exposure to the labor market and improving information transparency to better
motivate managerial eﬀort.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the model setup and
analyzes the labor market assessment of the manager's ability as well as the manager's
eﬀort input strategy. Section 3 characterizes the shareholders' optimal variable choices and
examines the impact of career concerns on shareholders decisions and Section 4 concludes
the paper.
2 The model
2.1 The model setup
Risk-neutral shareholders are endowed with a certain level of innovation urgency m (m > 0),
and commit to making an investment in innovation i (> 0) at a cost c
2
· i2 (c > 0). The
shareholders' innovation urgency, m, and decisions on innovation, i, are public information.
The assumption that shareholders make innovative investment decisions is descriptive of
ﬁrms' transformation practices. Although managers may usually be given complete authority
for decision makings in routine operations, investments in transformations are either initiated
or at least approved by the board. The shareholders hire a risk-averse manager to lead the
innovation. The manager is endowed with random ability, a, which is unknown to all. It
is common knowledge that a follows a normal distribution N(0, 1/ha). 1/ha represents the
ex-ante uncertainty of the manager's ability. The revenue, r, is shown as:
r = i ·m+ i · a+ e. (1)
The revenue consists of three components. The ﬁrst component i·m captures the comple-
mentary eﬀects of the innovation urgency and innovative investment on the output. When
the competition is intense or the market shifts radically, the shareholders have an intense ur-
gency to change the business practice (m is higher). In other words, innovation is proﬁtable
and the marginal beneﬁt of innovative investment is large. Shareholders therefore increase
the magnitude of innovation. However, due to the convexity of the investment cost, the
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investment should be ﬁnite. The second term i · a is contribution of the manager's ability
to the revenue. In previous studies, the sensitivity of revenue to the manager's ability is
assumed to be ﬁxed, usually normalized to 1. However this may not be descriptive on the
case in which managers are asked to undertake diﬀerent business. The manager's ability
is more crucial in transformations compared with routine business.3 Therefore, I assume
the manager's ability's eﬀect on the revenue is magniﬁed by the innovative investment i,
representing the fact that the manager's ability is more inﬂuential on the revenue when he
is asked to implement innovations.4 In other words, undertaking changes will largely expose
the manager's ability. Besides the manager's ability, the manager's eﬀort, e, contributes to
the ﬁrm's revenue as well. e could be thought of as the operating eﬀort in maintaining the
status quo. As is standard in literature, the manager's choice of eﬀort, e, is assumed to be
unobservable to the shareholders and the labor market and incurs cost 1
2
· e2 to the manager.
The revenue, r, is unobservable. However, a noisy signal y about r is contractible and
reported by the ﬁnancial reporting system:
y = r + ,
where  ∼ N [0, 1
h
], and h > 0.
The shareholders determine the quality of the ﬁnancial reporting system, h, and oﬀer
a contract linear in y, w1(y), to hire the manager. The manager will exert eﬀort, e, if he
accepts the contract. The timeline is summarized in Figure 1.
The model is a two-period model with Dates 0, 1, and 2. On Date 0, the shareholders
determine the ﬁnancial reporting system's quality h (> 0), commit to invest i in innovation,
and oﬀer a linear contract w1(y) to the manager. Following Gibbons and Murphy (1992), I
assume the contract is short term and linear in the accounting signal, y: w1(y) = k1y + c1.
The shareholders decisions are all publicly observable.
On Date 1, the manager accepts the contract if his expected utility is no less than his
reservation utility (i.e. his ex-ante expected ability), which is normalized to 0. The manager
3Banker et. al. (2013) indicate that managers in R&D intensive ﬁrms are taking relatively complex
jobs, including responding to competitor's actions and environmental changes promptly, making investment
decisions, managing the R&D work force, etc. As a result, the manager's ability is more important for R&D
intensive ﬁrms compared to non-R&D intensive ﬁrms.
4The mean of the manager's ability is normalized to zero, and as a result, ex-ante the shareholders cannot
beneﬁt from the manager's ability through innovative investment. m is the only source of beneﬁt for the
shareholders by investing in innovation.
I assume that in the revenue the only source of riskiness is manager ability uncertainty so that the revenue
randomness induces signiﬁcant career risk. I can introduce a systematic risk, η(η ∼ N [0, σ2]), and rewrite
the revenue as r = i · (m+ η) + i · a+ e. The main results will quantitatively hold. However, the career risk
will be dampened because the labor market believes that the revenue is partially attributable to random
shock rather than the manager's ability.
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Figure 1: The timeline of the setup.
inputs an operating eﬀort e > 0 at a cost 1
2
· e2. Then the signal y is reported and the
shareholders pay the manager w1(y).
On Date 2, the manager can either stay with the ﬁrm or leave and look for another
job. His new wage w2 is determined by the labor market as the perception of the manager's
ability based on the public signal y, namely w2 = E[a|y].5 The manager's career concerns are
introduced here. If the signal is low, the manager would be regarded as having low ability.
Therefore, in the future, the manager can only earn a low wage due to his bad reputation.
For a risk-averse manager, the volatility of future wages, w2, causes a dis-utility.
I assume the manager has an additively separable mean-variance utility function, as
shown in Eq (2). ρ is the manager's degree of risk aversion:
U(w1, w2, e) = E[w1]− ρ
2
V ar[w1]− 1
2
e2 + E[w2]− ρ
2
V ar[w2]. (2)
I assume that the manager does not have access to the credit market. This utility function
follows a study by Chen and Jiang (2006), who cite empirical evidence that managers cannot
completely hedge future career risks, particularly early in their careers (Jin, 2002; Garvey and
Mibourn, 2003).6 Many other studies assume that the principal is limited to oﬀering a ﬁxed
contract (Arya and Mittendorf, 2011; Dewatripont et al., 1990b; Hermalin and Weisbach,
2007) such that the shareholders cannot provide the manager insurance for his future career
risk through an incentive contract.
5To be more precise, E[a|y] is the manager's reservation utility on Date 2. I do not model the case in
which the manager is asked to implement innovations or exert eﬀort on Date 2. As a result, the manager's
future wage should exactly equal his reservation utility. If there is an eﬀort input or risk-taking on Date 2,
then the manager's future wage should compensate for the cost of eﬀort and risk. However, the manager's
certainty equivalent of his future wage should still equal his reservation utility E[a|y].
6The restriction here is simply to ensure that the manager cannot insure his career risks through savings or
lendings, which raises the manager's career concerns. This assumption is stronger than necessary. Actually,
the manager's career concerns exist as long as it is not possible to completely insure the manager's future
career risk. However, it is by assuming that insurance is totally infeasible that career concerns are most
succinctly captured.
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2.2 The labor market's updated belief about the manager's ability
and the manager's optimal eﬀort
I solve for the equilibrium by backward induction, starting with the labor market's perception
about the manager's ability on Date 2. Because the ﬁnal revenue depends on both the
manager's eﬀort and ability, to update the belief of the manager's ability, the labor market
makes a conjecture of e denoted by eˆ. Given eˆ, the updated belief of the manager's ability
upon signal, y, follows a normal distribution:
a|y ∼ N [ i/ha
vary
· (y − i ·m− eˆ), 1/ha · 1/h
vary
],
where vary is the variance of the signal y:
vary ≡ V ar[y] = i2/ha + 1/h.
The ﬁrst term of signal y's variance, i2/ha, is due to the uncertainty of the manager's
ability, and the innovation investment has a multiplicative eﬀect here. That is, innovations
induce riskiness in the business, especially when the manager's ability is highly uncertain.
The second term of vary, 1/h, is the noise of the accounting signal. In previous studies, the
randomness of the signal is taken as given. However, in this model, the signal's volatility is
contingent on shareholders' endogenous choices of innovative investment, i, and information
quality, h. The future wages can be expressed as:
w2(y, i, eˆ) = E[a|y] = k2 · (y − i ·m− eˆ), (3)
where k2 =
cov(a, y)
vary
= i/ha
vary
.
As suggested by previous studies, career concerns work as an implicit contract to the
manager: the manager has an incentive to exert eﬀort to improve the signal thereby obtaining
a better evaluation in the labor market.7 The slope of w2, k2 is referred as the career
concerns incentive. Lemma 1 captures that the career concerns incentive increases with the
information quality and the uncertainty about ability, 1/ha.
Lemma 1. The career concerns incentive,k2, increases with h and 1/ha.
Proof. See Appendix.
7In the equilibrium, the labor market's conjecture of the manager's eﬀort is consistent with the manager's
equilibrium eﬀort, and the labor market will accordingly undo the eﬀect of the manager's eﬀort on the
revenue. As a result, the manager's eﬀort will not bias the labor market's belief about his ability. However,
the manager still has the incentive to exert eﬀort. According to Holmstrom (1999), the manager is trapped
in supplying the equilibrium level that is expected of him, because, as in a rat race, a lower supply of labor
will bias the evaluation procedure against him.
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According to previous studies, career concerns stem from uncertainty about a manager's
ability. The stronger the career concerns (1/ha is larger), the higher the career concerns
incentive. I show that the information quality is also critical to the career concerns incentive.
The more informative the signal y about the revenue, the more weight the labor market puts
on the signal to form posterior beliefs about the manager's ability. The manager's eﬀort then
results in a stronger upward revision of the labor market perception. Therefore, the manager
is more motivated to exert eﬀort (k2 is higher). Lemma 1 shows that the career concerns
incentive increases with the information quality, as well as with the career concerns.
After considering the labor market perception about the manager's ability, I now return
to Date 1. The manager chooses the optimal eﬀort to maximize his expected utility, taking
the shareholders' explicit contract, w1, and his future wages determined by the labor market,
w2, as given. Formally, the manager solves Max
e
U(w1, w2, e).
From the ﬁrst-order condition of the manager's utility function, one can derive the man-
ager's optimal eﬀort, e∗ = k1 +k2. This is a standard result in literature, suggesting that the
managerial eﬀort is motivated by both the compensation incentive and the career concerns
incentive. Moreover, in the perfect Bayesian equilibrium, the labor market conjecture about
the manager's operating eﬀort eˆ should coincide with the manager's optimal operating eﬀort:
eˆ = e∗ = k1 + k2.
2.3 Managerial career risk
It can be seen from Eq (3) that the manager's future wages, w2, is contingent on the signal y.
Therefore, the volatility of w2 incurs a disutility to the manager,
ρ
2
V ar[w2], which is referred
to as career risk and denoted by CR, thus,
CR ≡ ρ
2
V ar[w2] =
ρ
2ha
i2/ha
vary
. (4)
It can be easily proved that CR increases with ρ and
1
ha
, both of which relate to the
manager's personal characteristics: the risk-averse degree as well as the ex-ante uncertainty
of his ability. Therefore, for the sake of illustration, I refer to ρ/ha as the degree of career
concern throughout: when the manager is more risk-averse (ρ is larger) or more uncertain
about his ability (ha is smaller), the career risk is larger. CR can then be rewritten as
a product of two terms, ρ
2ha
and i
2/ha
vary
, which is shown in Eq (4). The ﬁrst term, ρ
2ha
, is
the manager's degree of career concerns as discussed above. The second term, i
2/ha
vary
, is the
proportion of the total volatility of the performance measure y that is attributable to the
manager's unknown ability. This could be considered as the extent to which the manager's
ability is exposed to the labor market through the accounting signal. As the manager's ability
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is increasingly exposed in the labor market, the manager bears a higher career risk. It can
be veriﬁed that i
2/ha
vary
increases with the shareholders' two choice variables: the information
quality h and the innovative investment i.
Lemma 2. The manager's career risk, CR, increases with the information quality and the
innovative investment; i.e.,∂CR
∂h
> 0, and ∂CR
∂i
> 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
Hermalin and Weisbach (2007) indicate that in a more transparent information environ-
ment, the labor market puts more weight on the random signal when forming perceptions
about the manager's ability. Thus, the manager suﬀers from higher career risk. Besides the
information quality, a higher level of innovation makes the manager's ability has a stronger
inﬂuence on the ﬁrm's revenue, which leads to increased exposure of the manager's ability
in the labor market, thus creating a higher career risk as well.
3 Main Results
In the previous section, I characterized the labor market determination of the manager's
future wages, the manager's optimal eﬀort, and then captured the manager's career risk.
In this section, I return to Date 0 to examine the shareholders' optimal strategies about
the compensation contract, w1, the information quality, h, and the innovative investment,
i. I next characterize the impact of career concerns on the shareholders decisions on the
innovative investment and the compensation incentive. I then examine the manager's career
concerns' impact on the shareholders' equilibrium payoﬀ and provide a numerical example
comprised of heterogeneous shareholders and managers to illustrate the endogenous matching
patterns between shareholders and managers. I ﬁnally characterize the impact of imposing
a highly-stringent disclosure policy on ﬁrms' innovation decisions.
3.1 The shareholders' optimal decisions
On Date 0, the shareholders choose the optimal decisions on the compensation contract,
w1, the information quality, h, and the innovative investment, i, to maximize their expected
payoﬀ, pis. The compensation contract should satisfy the manager's participation constraint
(IR) and incentive compatible constraint (IC). The shareholders' problem is:
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Max
{k1,c1,h,i}
pis(k1, c1, h, i) = E[r|e = e∗]− E[w1(y)|e = e∗]− c
2
i2, (5)
s.t. U(w1, w2, e
∗) ≥ 0, (IR),
e∗ = argMax
e
U(w1, w2, e) (IC).
In the following, I restrict attention to the cases with interior solutions by assuming that
parameters ρ, ha, m, k satisfy condition C1.
Condition C1:
2+
√
2
2
< ρ/ha < (1 +
√
2)m and c > (
√
2−1)mρ
ha
.
I am able to show the shareholders' optimal choices of k1, c1, h, and i in the following
proposition.
Proposition 1. In the equilibrium, the shareholders optimally choose
the innovative investment i∗ =h
2
am−(
√
2−1)ρha
h2ac−(3−2
√
2)ρ
,
the information quality h∗ = 1
var∗y−i∗2/ha , where var
∗
y =
i∗[
√
2ha+(2+
√
2)ρ]
h2a+2i
∗ρha−i∗2ρ2 ,
and the contract w∗1(y) = k
∗
1y+c
∗
1, with k
∗
1 = 1−
√
2
2
−3
√
2−4
2ha
i∗ρ and c∗1 =
k∗22 −k∗21 +(k∗22 +k∗21 )ρvar∗y
2
−
k∗1 · i∗ ·m, where k∗2 =
√
2
2
− (2−
√
2)
ha
i∗ρ is the equilibrium career concerns incentive.
Proof. See Appendix.
In the equilibrium, the IR constraint of Eq (5) is binding. As a result, according to Eq
(2), the expected payment to the manager by the shareholders, E[w∗1], can be calculated as:
E[w∗1] =
ρ
2
V ar[w∗1] +
1
2
e∗2 + C∗R, (6)
where C∗R =
ρ
2ha
i∗2/ha
var∗y
is the equilibrium career risk.8
The expression of Eq (6) is similar to the equilibrium compensation payment in a standard
principal-agent model without career concerns, which covers the manager's cost of eﬀort
and the risk from the explicit contract, with the addition of the manager's career risk. In
other words, the manager's disutility of his career risk must be compensated by the explicit
contract. Balkin et al. (2000) ﬁnd empirical evidence that for high-tech ﬁrms, CEOs' short-
term compensation is positively related to innovation. My model may provide a possible
explanation for this evidence. According to Lemma 2, with other things held equal, the
manager's career risk increases with innovative investment. In other words, managers in
ﬁrms with high levels of innovative investment bear higher career risks, which must be
compensated with a higher payments from the shareholders.
8Note that E[w2] is the ex-ante expected value of the manager's ability, which is normalized to 0.
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It can be seen from Proposition 1 that the shareholders' equilibrium decisions depend
on both the innovation urgency, m, and the manager's characteristics, ρ and ha. With the
manager's characteristics held equal, it can be veriﬁed that as m increases, the shareholders'
equilibrium innovative investment, i∗increases while the optimal information quality h∗ de-
creases. It is intuitive that the shareholders increase the magnitude of innovative investment
as innovation becomes more proﬁtable. Larger innovation magnitude induces more exposure
of the manager's ability in the labor market and thus increases the manager's career risk for
which the shareholders must compensate. To mitigate the manager's career risk, the share-
holders choose to reduce the information quality. Therefore, the shareholders' equilibrium
information quality, h∗, decreases with m. The above results are presented in the following
corollary.
Corollary 1. The innovative investment that maximizes the shareholders' expected payoﬀ, i∗,
increases with the innovation urgency ; i.e., ∂i
∗
∂m
> 0. The information quality that maximizes
the shareholders' expected payoﬀ, h∗, decreases with the innovation urgency ; i.e.,∂h
∗
∂m
< 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
Corollary 1 implies that ﬁrms with a higher level of innovative investment may choose
a lower level of information quality. Empirical evidence shows that the value relevance of
ﬁnancial statement has been deteriorating during the recent decades (Lev and Zarowin, 1999;
Chang, 1998; and Srivastava, 2013). Lev and Zarowin (1999) ﬁnd that the deterioration
in the usefulness of ﬁnancial information to investors is due to changes in business scale.
Firms undergoing considerable business changes, which are measured by changes in book or
market values, have a signiﬁcant decline in the informativeness of ﬁnancial statements. They
interpret this evidence as the result of business changes generally driven by R&D investments.
R&D investments are usually believed to lower the informativeness of ﬁnancial statements
in two ways: ﬁrst, the ﬁnancial statements cannot reﬂect the economic consequences of
innovations (Healy and Palepu, 2001); second, the outcomes of R&D investments are highly
uncertain, resulting in high volatility in both incomes and cash ﬂows (Srivastava, 2013).
My results may provide an alternative explanation from the career concerns point of view.
That is, when ﬁrms initiate changes in business practices by investing in innovations, their
managers are bearing future career risk. In a survey conducted by Graham et. al., (2005)
most managers agree that they have a strong incentive to meet the earnings target due to
reputation concerns rather than short-term compensation, suggesting that managers' career
concerns have an important inﬂuence on ﬁnancial reporting practices. My result suggests
that shareholders may choose less stringent policies for preparing ﬁnancial statements, which
works to mitigate the manager's career risk. This ﬁnding provides implications for future
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empirical research on the interaction between innovative investment and disclosure policy
regarding managers' career concerns.
Shareholders decisions depend not only on the urgency of innovation, but also on the
manager's characteristics. For ﬁrms with a homogenous level of innovation urgency, share-
holders' decisions may be diﬀerent if their managers are heterogeneous regarding to career
concerns. As shown in Lemma 2, shareholders can mitigate the manager's career risk in two
ways: reducing the information quality of the accounting signal, or reducing the magnitude
of innovation. However, both methods are costly to shareholders. A lower level of infor-
mation quality hinders contracting with the manager, resulting in a lower level of operation
eﬀort. Reducing the innovation magnitude directly reduces the proﬁt of innovation, espe-
cially when there is an intense innovation urgency. The shareholders optimally determine
the level of information quality and innovative investment to maximize their expected payoﬀ,
given the manager's degree of career concerns. In the following sections, I will examine the
manager's career concerns' impact on the shareholders' choices of innovative investment and
information quality.
3.2 The manager's career concerns' eﬀect on the shareholders' op-
timal innovative investment
I now analyze the eﬀect of the manager's degree of career concern on the ﬁrm's optimal
innovative investment. In the case in which the manager's ability is perfectly observable
(ha = ∞), namely, when there are no career concerns, it is easy to see that the career risk
is 0. In other words, the shareholders do not need to compensate the manager extra for his
career risk. The shareholders will optimally choose perfect information to most eﬃciently
motivate the manager's operating eﬀort and choose innovative investment to maximize the
innovation proﬁt i(m+ a)− c
2
i2. That is, the shareholders' optimal decisions on information
quality and innovative investment are independent. For example, consider the case in which
the manager's ability, a, is known as 0 for certain, which is the ex-ante expected ability in
the model, then optimal innovative investment for the shareholders is i0 = m/c. Corollary
2 shows that in the presence of career concerns, the shareholders invest less in innovation
compared with the case in which there is no career concerns, namely i∗ < i0.
Corollary 2. The shareholders underinvest in innovation in the presence of career concerns,
compared with the case in which the manager's ability is perfectly observable as 0; i.e., i∗ =
h2am−(
√
2−1)ρha
h2ac−(3−2
√
2)ρ
< i0 = m/c.
Proof. See Appendix.
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In the event that the manager is uncertain about his ability (i.e., ha < ∞), the man-
ager's degree of career concern aﬀects the shareholders' innovation decisions. The innovation
increases the variability of the revenue due to the manager's ability uncertainty and conse-
quently induces higher volatility in the signal. According to the standard principal-agent
model, the manager's equilibrium eﬀort decreases as the risk unrelated to the eﬀort increases.
Thus, the beneﬁt of motivating the manager's eﬀort decreases with i. Furthermore, as men-
tioned earlier in Lemma 2, the manager's career risk increases with innovative investment.
Both eﬀects of the innovation are costly to the shareholders. As a result, due to the man-
ager's career concerns, there is a downward distortion in the shareholders decisions on the
innovative investment.
I next analyze the relationship between the degree of career concern and the shareholders'
optimal innovative investment, represented in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. The shareholders' optimal innovative investment increases (decreases) as
the manager's degree of career concern becomes weaker when the level of innovation urgency
is low (high); i.e.,
d i∗
d ρ/ha
< 0 if m < (
√
2−1)(ρ/ha)2+(
√
2+1)c
2ρ/ha
, and
d i∗
d ρ/ha
> 0 if m > (
√
2−1)(ρ/ha)2+(
√
2+1)c
2ρ/ha
.
Proof. See Appendix.
It is helpful to illustrate the above results through Figure 2, which shows a numerical ex-
ample (c = 2) of the relationship between the shareholders' equilibrium choice variables (i∗,
h∗/ha, and k∗1) and the degree of career concern,
ρ
ha
. Figure 2 depicts three cases contingent
on diﬀerent expected returns of innovation (m = 1, 1.5, 2). In each cases, the X-axis is the
manager's degree of career concerns, and the Y-axis is the shareholders' optimal choice vari-
ables, which are i∗, h∗/ha, and k∗1 respectively. Figure 2 shows that the relationship between
the shareholders' optimal choice variables and the manager's degree of career concerns is
nonmonotonic, depending on the level of innovation urgency. A detailed analysis is provided
as follows.
As the manager's degree of career concern increases, the shareholders must compensate
the manager more for higher career risk. As discussed in Lemma 2, the shareholders have
two methods of mitigating the manager's career risk: lowering the innovative investment and
lowering the information quality. To examine how the shareholders use these two methods,
the equilibrium career risk can be rewritten as follows:
C∗R =
ρ
2ha
i∗2/ha
var∗y
=
ρ
2ha
i∗ · k∗2. (7)
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Figure 2: The shareholders' equilibrium choice variables with respect to the manager's degree
of career concern.
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From Eq (7), I derive the impact of the innovative investment on the manager's career
risk,
∂ C∗R
∂ i∗ =
1
2
ρ
ha
k∗2. Because the manager's career risk is costly to the shareholders, the
shareholders have an incentive to decrease the innovative investment when the impact of the
innovative investment on career risk increases. As the manager's degree of career concern ρ
ha
increases, I have
d
∂ C∗R
∂ i∗
d ρ
ha
=
∂
∂ C∗R
∂ i∗
∂ ρ
ha
+
∂
∂ C∗R
∂ i∗
∂ k∗2
∂ k∗2
∂ ρ
ha
=
1
2
k∗2 + (−
2−√2
2
i∗
ρ
ha
). (8)
From the ﬁrst term of Eq (8) (
∂
∂ C∗R
∂ i∗
∂ ρ
ha
> 0), we can see that an increase in the degree
of career concern provides a direct incentive for the shareholders to reduce i, because the
innovation investment results in higher career risk. However, there is an indirect incentive
(
∂
∂ C∗R
∂ i∗
∂ k∗2
∂ k∗2
∂ ρ
ha
< 0) to increase i, which is implied by the second term of Eq (8). The reason is
that the increase of ρ
ha
also provides an incentive for the shareholders to reduce the informa-
tion quality, resulting in lower k∗2. The decline in k
∗
2 dampens i's impact on CR, and provides
the shareholders an incentive to increase the innovative investment. The indirect incentive
is strong enough to dominate the direct incentive if the information quality dramatically
declines, such that the shareholders increase the innovative investment as a response to a
higher degree of career concern.
The indirect incentive dominates when the level of innovation urgency, m, is large, as
shown in the case m = 2 in Figure 2. In this case, innovation proﬁt relatively outweighs
the managerial eﬀort in the shareholders' expected payoﬀ. The shareholders invest a lot in
innovation. As career concerns become stronger, driven by either a higher risk-averse degree
or larger ability uncertainty, the beneﬁt of motivating the manager's operating eﬀort declines.
Because the innovative investment magniﬁes the revenue volatility that is attributable to
the manager's ability uncertainty, the decline is exacerbated by the investment. In other
words, the increase of career concerns dampens the tradeoﬀ of reducing the information
quality, especially when the innovative investment is high. Therefore, when the level of
innovation urgency is high, as career concerns become stronger, the shareholders largely lower
the information quality to mitigate the manager's career risk, and increase the innovative
investment to most eﬃciently earn innovation proﬁts.
Serﬂing (2012) ﬁnds that ﬁrms with younger CEOs invest more than ﬁrms with older
CEOs, and the evidence only prevails with respect to high-growth industries. Conventional
wisdom interprets this as that older CEOs may be more conservative, or have the horizon
problem that they cannot beneﬁt from the long-term return of the investment. However,
Serﬂing (2012) documents that older CEO compensation contains fewer stock options than
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younger CEO, which implies that shareholders do not tend to encourage older CEOs to in-
vest. My results explain this ﬁnding from the career concerns point of view. High growth
is associated with high levels of innovative investment, which induce relatively volatile rev-
enue. There is large ability uncertainty among young managers, which magniﬁes the revenue
volatility. The volatility impedes motivating the manager's eﬀort and shifts shareholders'
focus towards innovation. As a result, the shareholders will increase innovative investment
and choose a lower level of information quality to protect managers from career risk. In con-
trast, an older manager's ability is well known and less uncertain, therefore, the revenue is
not as volatile. Thus, the shareholders have comparably intense incentives of motivating the
manager's operating eﬀort and obtaining innovation proﬁt. In other words, the shareholders
will not overemphasize either the innovation or the eﬀort. Therefore, the shareholders choose
a lower level of innovative investment and a higher level of information quality. The above
analysis suggests the underinvestment of older CEOs in a high growth ﬁrm may actually
work in the shareholders' favor.
In contrast to the case with a large m, when the level of innovation urgency is not
extremely large, the direct incentive dominates and the shareholders reduce the innovative
investment to mitigate the manager's career risk. Many empirical ﬁndings suggest ﬁrms with
managers that have large career concerns invest less. For example, Pan et al. (2013) empir-
ically ﬁnd that ﬁrms with CEOs in early tenure tend to disinvest, and increase investment
subsequently. Likewise, Barker and Mueller (2002) ﬁnd that ﬁrms with more experienced
CEOs in output functions (functions emphasize growth through discovering new products
and markets, such as marketing/sales and engineering/R&D) spend more on R&D. My re-
sult suggests that this evidence may present only in ﬁrms that are not engaged in intensive
innovations.
3.3 The manager's career concerns' eﬀect on the shareholders' op-
timal explicit incentive
I next examine how the degree of career concern aﬀects the explicit incentive k∗1. The
relationship between the CEO pay-performance-sensitivities (PPS) and CEO characteristics
related to career concerns has been extensively studied. Previous studies suggest that as
the manager's tenure increases, his ability uncertainty decreases, and his career concerns
incentive decreases. Consequently, shareholders increase the explicit incentive to motivate
the manager's eﬀort (namely the substitution eﬀect). In other words, for managers with a
shorter tenure or who have less experience, the career concerns incentive is relatively strong,
which lead to a lower level of explicit incentive. However, I ﬁnd the substitution eﬀect does
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not always exist when the innovative investment decision is considered. To see this, consider
the equilibrium explicit incentive, k∗1, and career concerns incentive, k
∗
2, characterized in
Proposition 1:
k∗2 =
√
2
2
− (2−
√
2)i∗
ρ
ha
, (9)
k∗1 = 1−
√
2
2
− (3
√
2/2− 2)i∗ ρ
ha
. (10)
In previous studies such as Gibbons and Murphy (1992), the career concerns incentive,
k2, depends only on the manager's characteristics represented by ρ and ha. However, in my
model, the shareholders are able to set the information quality and innovative investment in
response to the manager's career concerns, both of which aﬀect the career concerns incentive.
In other words, the shareholders are able to determine the career concerns incentive through
the information quality and set the explicit incentive through the contract. Because both
incentives are contingent on the same performance measure, y, they should response to
the manager's career concerns in the same direction to optimize the shareholders' expected
payoﬀ, which is in contrast to the diﬀerent movement directions of the explicit incentive and
career concerns incentive with respect to career concerns as suggested in previous studies.
As a result, the substitution eﬀect may not always hold, especially when the innovation
urgency is small. In this case, the shareholders invest little in innovation and focus on
motivating the manager's eﬀort by choosing a high level of information quality. Due to
the low innovative investment, the ﬁrm's business is relatively safe and the revenue is less
volatile. Motivating the manager's eﬀort is then eﬃcient, hence the beneﬁt of motivating
the manager's eﬀort is large. On the other hand, due to the high level of information quality,
the labor market pays particular attention to the accounting signal when evaluating the
manager's ability. As a result, reducing the innovative investment, thereby reducing the
volatility of the accounting signal, is an eﬃcient way to mitigate the career risk. Therefore,
as the degree of career concerns increases, the shareholders' focus shifts further toward
motivating the operating eﬀort. The shareholders will increase the compensation incentive
and mitigate the manager's career risk by dramatically reducing the innovative investment
(as shown in the case ofm = 1 in Figure 2). The above results are summarized in Proposition
4.
Proposition 3. In the equilibrium, the shareholders' optimal explicit incentive increases
(decreases) as the manager's degree of career concern becomes weaker when the level of in-
novation urgency is low (high); i.e.,
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d k∗1
dρ/ha
< 0 if m > (6−4
√
2)cρ/ha
(5
√
2−7)(ρ/ha)2+(
√
2−1)c , and
d k∗1
dρ/ha
> 0 if m < (6−4
√
2)cρ/ha
(5
√
2−7)(ρ/ha)2+(
√
2−1)c .
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 3 identiﬁes the link between CEO PPS with career concerns through innova-
tive investment. It suggests that career concerns impact PPS non-monotonically depending
on the expected level of innovation urgencym. For ﬁrms with low levels of innovation urgency
such as monopoly ﬁrms, the above results predict a positive relationship between managers'
career concerns and PPS. The prediction stems from the fact that as the manager's degree
of career concern diminishes, the shareholders invest more in innovation, resulting in volatile
revenues. Therefore, the shareholders choose to reduce PPS because it is less eﬃcient in
motivating the manager's eﬀort. However, for ﬁrms with larger R&D spending such as,
high-tech ﬁrms, the above results predict a negative relationship between the manager's ca-
reer concerns and PPS. The reason is that as the manager's career concerns get weaker, the
eﬃciency of motivating the manager's eﬀort largely improves and the shareholders conse-
quently increase the PPS. Because the level of innovation urgency varies among industries,
Proposition 3 suggests that we should examine the link between managers' career concerns
and PPS in cross-industry studies.
3.4 The eﬀect of career concerns on the shareholders payoﬀ
So far, I have analyzed the shareholders' optimal choice variables and the manager's optimal
eﬀort inputting strategy. In the equilibrium, the shareholders' expected payoﬀ is calculated
as:
pi∗s(m,
ρ
ha
) =
c+m[m− 2(√2− 1)ρ/ha]
2[c− (3− 2√2)(ρ/ha)2]
. (11)
With all other things held equal, a higher degree of career concern leads to higher career
risk for the manager, which should be compensated by the shareholders. Furthermore, a
higher degree of career concern reduces the manager's incentive to exert eﬀort, which also
negatively aﬀects the shareholders. Thus, the shareholders' expected payoﬀ decreases with
the degree of the manager's career concerns. Throughout this study, I assume that there
is only one ﬁrm and managers are identical in their degree of career concerns. However, in
reality, managers are heterogeneous in their career concerns while the innovation urgency
varies among ﬁrms. For instance, more experienced managers, whose ability is well known
and have less uncertainty than rookie managers could be considered to have a lower degree of
career concern. Because the shareholders are better oﬀ with managers having a lower degree
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of career concern, the shareholders may compete to hire experienced managers. Competition
increases experienced managers' compensation. Finally, experienced managers will be hired
by the shareholders who most value them most.
One way to observe this is by considering a matching model for a market with N ﬁrms
and N managers. The number of the players are not crucial. For example, I assume N = 11.
Firm j is endowed with a level of innovation urgency, mj while manager k is endowed with
a degree of career concerns, dk ≡ ρk/hka, j, k = 1, 2..., 11. mj and dk are public information.
I still assume managers have the same expected ability, which is normalized to 0. However,
uncertainty about their ability, hka, or risk aversion degree, ρk, may be diﬀerent, which
captures the fact that managers are diﬀerent in tenure or experience. Moreover, I assume
{mj} is an arithmetic sequence between 1 and 2 with a common diﬀerence of 0.1, while dk
is an arithmetic sequence between 2 and 2.4 with a common diﬀerence of 0.04. Each ﬁrm is
matched with one manager. A matching pair of ﬁrm j and manager k, (mj, dk), generates
a net proﬁt Πj,k = pi
∗
s(mj, dk), which is the ﬁrms revenue subtract the shareholder's cost of
innovation and the manager's cost of eﬀort and risk. In the main setting with the assumption
of one ﬁrm and identical managers, the shareholders grab all the net proﬁt and the manager's
participation constraint is binding. In the current case, there are heterogeneous managers
and ﬁrms, and shareholders are competing in hiring experienced managers. As a result,
managers may earn a premium due to the competition and shareholders can only get part
of the net proﬁt Πj,k. Denote xj,k ∈ {0, 1} as the result of matching: xj,k = 1 if ﬁrm j hires
manager k, and xj,k = 0 otherwise. By the assignment game in Shapley and Shubik (1972),
I can derive the equilibrium matchings {x∗j,k} by solving the following linear programming
problem:
Max
{xj,k}
11∑
k=1
11∑
j=1
Πj,k · xj,k,
s.t.
11∑
j=1
xj,k ≤ 1;
11∑
j=1
xj,k ≤ 1;
xj,k ≥ 0.
It is a standard result (as shown in Roth and Sotomayour, 1990) that there exists a
solution {x∗j,k} to the above linear programming problem with x∗j,k = 0 or 1. The equilibrium
matching pattern is depicted in the following ﬁgure, where the X-axis is the shareholders'
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Figure 3: The equilibrium matching pattern.
innovation urgency, mj, and the Y-axis is the manager's degree of career concerns, dk. The
dot with coordinate (mj, dk) means the shareholders with mj hires the manager dk in the
equilibrium matching pattern, namely x∗j,k = 1.
It can be seen from Figure 3 that in the equilibrium matching pattern, the managers with
the least career concerns are hired by ﬁrms with intermediate levels of innovation urgency.
The intuition is that the equilibrium matching pattern maximizes the sum of proﬁts from all
pairs of ﬁrms and managers. Because managers with lower degrees of career concern generate
higher proﬁts, they are hired by shareholders who value them most. For the shareholders,
the value of a less career concerned manager is measured by the marginal beneﬁt of reducing
the degree of career concern, −d pi
∗
s (m,
ρ
ha
)
d ρ/ha
, which depends on the innovation urgency, m. It
can be veriﬁed that −d pi
∗
s (m,
ρ
ha
)
d ρ/ha
has an inverse U-shape relationship with respect to the level
of innovation urgency m, which is shown in Proposition 4. Figure 4 shows a numerical
example of the relationship between − d pi∗s
d ρ/ha
and the level of innovation urgency, when c = 2
and ρ/ha = 2. One way to understand Figure 4 is to consider the extreme cases in which the
level of innovation urgency is excessively low or high. For ﬁrms with a level of innovation
urgency, the innovative investment is low, which barely exposes the manager's ability through
the accounting signal. As previously shown in the case m = 1 in Figure 2, as the degree
of career concern increases, the shareholders choose a higher level of information quality
to motivate higher eﬀort and at the same time decreases the innovative investment. The
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shareholders are worse oﬀ by innovation decline, yet can be compensated somehow through
the manager's higher eﬀort. As a result, the shareholders' expected payoﬀ does not decrease
that much as the manager's degree of career concerns increases. In the opposite case, wherein
the level of innovation urgency is extremely high, as shown in the case m = 2 in Figure 2,
in which the degree of career concern increases, the shareholders focus more on innovation,
choosing a lower level of information quality to mitigate the manager's career risk. The
incremental innovation proﬁt oﬀsets the shareholders' innovation proﬁt decline. As a result,
the shareholders' expected payoﬀ is not very sensitive to the manager's degree of career
concern.
Unlike the extreme cases, for intermediate values of m, there is a strong tension between
motivating the manager's eﬀort and obtaining innovation proﬁt. As shown in the case of
m = 1.5 in Figure 2, when the manager's degree of career concern increases, the shareholders
are not able to rely on either method to mitigate the career risk, but have to decrease both the
information quality and the innovative investment. As a result, the shareholders incur losses
from both the lower eﬀort and innovation proﬁt. In this case, hiring a manager with less
career concerns largely improves the shareholders' expected payoﬀ. Proposition 4 presents
the above results.
Proposition 4. The shareholders' marginal beneﬁt of reducing the degree of career concern
− d pi∗s
d ρ/ha
has an inverse U-shaped relationship with the expected level of innovation urgency:
− d pi∗s
d ρ/ha
increases with m if m < (
√
2−1)(ρ/ha)2+(
√
2+1)c
2ρ/ha
, and decreases with m if m >
(
√
2−1)(ρ/ha)2+(
√
2+1)c
2ρ/ha
.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 4 together with Figure 3 provide various implications for empirical stud-
ies about the relationship between managers' characteristics regarding career concerns and
ﬁrms' innovation decisions. It shows that compared with their peers with intermediate levels
of innovation urgency, shareholders with extreme values of innovation urgency have payoﬀs
less sensitive to managers' career concerns. The reason is that shareholders will protect the
manager from career risk by either implementing relatively safe business practices (for share-
holders with low levels of innovation urgency), or disclosing less information (for shareholders
with high levels of innovation urgency). However, for ﬁrms with intermediate levels of in-
novation urgency, stronger career concerns result in both lower innovation investment and
managerial productive eﬀort. As a result, managers' career concerns are most detrimental to
shareholders. In other words, these shareholders are the ones that most favor an experienced
manager that has ability with less uncertainty and is less concerned about exposure in the
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Figure 4: The marginal beneﬁt of reducing the manager's degree of career concern as a
function of m.
labor market. My result predicts that experienced managers are hired by middle-of-the-road
innovation ﬁrms.
3.5 What if a regulator mandates a high level of information qual-
ity?
Throughout the paper, I assume that the shareholders are able to choose both the information
quality and the innovative investment. However, it would be interesting to examine the case
in which a regulator determines the information quality, and to study how shareholders
choose the innovative investment as a response. Due to the complexity of the model, the
shareholders' optimal level of innovative investment for a given level of information quality
i∗(h) cannot be solved in the closed-form. However, I ﬁnd that the shareholders will reduce
the innovative investment when a regulator enforces a level of information quality above the
shareholders' optimal level, which is summarized in Proposition 5.
Proposition 5. An improvement in the information quality from the optimal level for the
shareholders would induce the shareholders to decrease innovative investment; i.e.,
∂
∂ pis(k
∗
1 ,c
∗
1,h,i)
∂ i
∂ h
<
0 for i = i∗and h = h∗.
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Proposition 5 echoes concerns by regulators and academics that the implementation of
SOX may induce a decline in ﬁrms' R&D investments. SOX mandates internal control
disclosures and improves transparency by increasing disclosure requirements. There is plenty
of empirical evidence showing that ﬁrms' R&D investments declined dramatically since SOX
was enacted (Bargeron et.al., 2009; Cohen et.al., 2013). This phenomenon is interpreted
as that SOX incurs an extra reporting cost to the ﬁrm for R&D practices, resulting in less
R&D investment. For example, the Biotechnology Industry Organization sent a letter to
the SEC, commenting on SOX's Section 404 rules: Many emerging biotech companies are
directing precious resources away from core research and development of new therapies for
patients due to overly complex controls or unnecessary evaluation of controls (Lehn, 2008).
My results provide a possible explanation for this evidence regarding the manager's career
concerns. I expect that after the implementation of SOX, ﬁrms disclosure is more informative,
which helps the labor market form a more accurate perception about managerial ability. My
results imply that the mandated high information quality leads to a higher career risk for
the manager. To mitigate the manager's career risk, the shareholders consequently decrease
the innovative investment.
4 Conclusions
This study examines shareholders joint decisions on the information quality and innovative
investment in the presence of managers' career concerns. Innovation initiatives are instructed
by shareholders with the objective to transform the ﬁrm and increase its competitiveness.
However, this kind of investments expose the manager's ability conspicuously to the labor
market. This exposure increases the manager's career risk, which must be compensated
through an explicit contract. In other words, innovation generates managerial career risk,
which is a cost to shareholders.
I identify two methods by which shareholders can mitigate managerial career risk: lower-
ing reporting information quality and reducing innovative investment. Nevertheless, lowering
information quality makes motivating managerial operating eﬀort more diﬃcult. Therefore,
shareholders, face a tradeoﬀ between mitigating the manager career-risk and motivating
the managerial eﬀort. The relative value of innovation and the managerial eﬀort for share-
holders is mainly contingent on the level of innovation urgency. I ﬁnd that the impact of
the manager's degree of career concerns on shareholders decisions on innovative investment,
information quality and explicit incentives is non-monotonically contingent on the level of
innovation urgency.
When the level of innovation urgency is high, shareholders focus more on innovation and
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reduce information quality to mitigate the manager's career risk. As a result, the information
quality declines dramatically when the manager degree of career concerns increases. A lower
information quality protects the manager in the labor market, and induces shareholders to
increase innovative investment. Therefore, the shareholders increase innovative investment
as the degree of career concern increases.
When the level of innovation urgency is low, as the manager's degree of career concern
increases, shareholders rely on reducing innovative investment to mitigate the manager's
career risk. As the innovative investment declines, the ﬁrm outcome becomes less volatile,
and that allows shareholders to choose a higher explicit incentive to motivate the manager's
operating eﬀort.
For intermediate levels of innovation urgency, shareholders have to reduce both informa-
tion quality and innovative investment in response to an increase in the manager's career
concerns, which leads to both lower innovation proﬁt and lower productive eﬀort. There-
fore, ﬁrms with intermediate levels of innovation urgency favor experienced managers (i.e.
managers with lower career concerns) most.
This study contributes to the extant literature that examines the interaction between
managers' career concerns and shareholders' investment decisions regarding innovation. My
results indicate that the relationship between managers' career concerns and ﬁrms' invest-
ment and compensation decisions depend non-monotonically on the level of innovation ur-
gency. When we examine the impact of career concerns on ﬁrms' decisions on investment,
managerial incentives and manager selection, we need to consider the ﬁrms' innovation ur-
gency. Because the level of innovation urgency may also varies among industries, my results
shed light on cross-industry studies on the impact of career concerns on ﬁrms' aforementioned
decisions.
5 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1:
Proof. The deduction of w2(y) follows standard procedures. We have:
y = i · (m+ a) + e+ , where a ∼ N [0, 1/ha], and  ∼ N [0, 1/h].
Therefore, after observing y, the labor market's updated belief about a, w2(y), is:
w2(y) = E[a|y] = Cov(a, y)
V ar[y]
· (y − E[y]).
Since Cov(a, y) = i/ha and E[y] = i ·m+ eˆ, the above equation yields w2(y)= k2(y − i ·
m− b · eˆ), where k2 = i/havary and vary ≡ V ar[y] = i2/ha + 1/h.
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It can be proved that ∂ k2
∂ h
> 0, and ∂ k2
∂ ha
< 0.
Proof of Lemma 2:
Proof. From Eq (6), CR =
ρ
2ha
i2/ha
vary
. Substituting vary = i
2/ha + 1/h into CR, it can be
derived that:
∂ Cr
∂ h
= i
2ρ
2(ha+h·i2)2 > 0;
∂ Cr
∂ i
= h·i·ρ
(ha+h·i2)2 > 0.
Proof of Proposition 1:
Proof. In the model, the shareholders make decisions on the i, h, and w1 simultaneously.
However, for the sake of illustration, I ﬁrst calculate the shareholders' optimal linear contract
taking information i and h as given. Then, I solve for the shareholders' optimal informa-
tion quality given i and the shareholders' optimal linear contract. Finally, I solve for the
shareholders optimal investment decision. According to the envelope theorem, the result I
derive from solving the three choice variables sequentially will be the same as solving them
simultaneously.
First, I solve for the shareholders optimal linear contract taking h and i as given: w∗1(i, h).
Substituting the manager's optimal eﬀort e∗ = k1 + k2 into the manager's expected utility
function Eq (2) yields:
U(w1, w2, e) = k1(i ·m+ k1 + k2) + c1 − ρ
2
k21vary −
1
2
(k1 + k2)
2 − ρ
2
k22vary.
In the equilibrium, the manager's IR constraint should be binding, namely U(w1, w2, e) =
0. It can be easily veriﬁed that vary =
i/ha
k2
. As a result, c1 can be derived as:
c∗1(k1, i, h) =
k22 − k21 + (k22 + k21)ρ · vary
2
− k1 · i ·m.
Substituting c1 = c
∗
1(k1, i, h) into shareholder's objective function as shown in Eq (5),
and from the ﬁrst order condition w.r.t k1, it can be derived:
k∗1(i, h) =
1−k2
1+ρvary
.
Consequently, c∗1(i, h) can be calculated as:
c∗1(i, h) = c
∗
1(k
∗
1(i, h), i, h) =
k22−k∗21 +(k22+k∗21 )ρ·vary
2
− k∗1 · i ·m.
The shareholders' optimal linear contract taking i and h as given is:
w∗1(i, h) = k
∗
1(i, h) · y + c∗1(i, h).
Next, I solve for the shareholders optimal information quality given w∗1(i, h) and i: h
∗(i).
After substituting e = k1 + k2, k2 =
i/ha
vary
and w∗1(i, h) derived above into Eq (5), the
sharheolders' objective function can be expressed as:
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pis(h, i) = i ·m+
1 + ρ · i/ha · (2− iha/vary)
2(1 + ρ · vary) −
ρ
2ha
i2/ha
vary
− c
2
i2. (12)
In order to derive the optimal h for a given level of i, h∗(i), it is instructive to solve for the
optimal volatility of the signal, vary, for the shareholders ﬁrst. Becausevary = i
2/ha + 1/h
and h > 0, vary should be no less than i
2/ha. I focus on the interior solution which is
sustainable under Condition 1. From the ﬁrst order condition of pis(h, i) w.r.t vary, with
Condition 1, it can be derived:
var∗y(i) =
i[
√
2ha+(2+
√
2)ρ]
h2a+2iρha−i2ρ2 .
The optimal information quality h∗(i) can be calculated as:
h∗(i) = 1
var∗y(i)−i2/ha .
Now, I calculate the shareholders optimal i in the equilibrium. Substituting h = h∗(i)
and w1 = w
∗
1(i, h) into Eq (5), the sharheolder's objective function can be expressed as
pis(i) = i ·m+ h
2
a − 2(
√
2− 1)haiρ+ (3− 2
√
2)i2ρ2
2h2a
− c
2
i2.
The ﬁrst order condition w.r.t. i yields:
i∗ = h
2
am−(
√
2−1)ρha
h2ac−(3−2
√
2)ρ
.
Substituting i∗ = h
2
am−(
√
2−1)ρha
h2ac−(3−2
√
2)ρ
into h∗(i), and w∗1(i, h), Proposition 1 will be derived.
Proof of Corollary 1:
Proof. It can be veriﬁed that under Condition 1,
∂i∗
∂m
= 1
c−(3−2√2)(ρ/ha)2 > 0 and
∂h∗(i)
∂i
< 0.
Therefore, I can derive that ∂h
∗
∂m
= ∂h
∗(i)
∂i∗ · ∂i
∗
∂m
< 0.
Proof of Corollary 2:
Proof. It can be easily veriﬁed that i∗ = h
2
am−(
√
2−1)ρha
h2ac−(3−2
√
2)ρ
< i0 = m/c for any ρ/ha > 0.
Proof of Proposition 2:
Proof. d i
∗
d ρ
ha
= (5
√
2− 7) · −(ρ/ha)2+2(1+
√
2)m·ρ/ha−(3+2
√
2)c
[c−(3−2√2)(ρ/ha)2]2
Therefore, it can be derived that:
d i∗
d ρ
ha
< 0 if m < (
√
2−1)(ρ/ha)2+(
√
2+1)c
2ρ/ha
, and d i
∗
d ρ
ha
> 0 if m > (
√
2−1)(ρ/ha)2+(
√
2+1)c
2ρ/ha
.
Proof of Proposition 3:
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Proof. Substituting i∗ = h
2
am−(
√
2−1)ρha
h2ac−(3−2
√
2)ρ
into k∗1 as shown in Eq (10), we can rewrite k
∗
1 as:
k∗1 =
(2−√2)·c−(3√2−4)m·ρ/ha]
2[c−(3−2√2)(ρ/ha)2] .
As a result, we have
d k∗1
d ρ
ha
= 2(10−7
√
2)c·ρ/ha−m[(17
√
2−24)(ρ/ha)2+(3
√
2−4)c]
2[c−(3−2√2)(ρ/ha)2]2 .
Therefore, we can derive:
d k∗1
d ρ
ha
< 0 if m > (6−4
√
2)cρ/ha
(5
√
2−7)(ρ/ha)2+(
√
2−1)c , and
d k∗1
d ρ
ha
> 0 if m < (6−4
√
2)cρ/ha
(5
√
2−7)(ρ/ha)2+(
√
2−1)c .
Proof of Proposition 4:
Proof. Substituting i∗ = h
2
am−(
√
2−1)ρha
h2ac−(3−2
√
2)ρ
, h∗ and w∗1 derived in Proposition 1 into the share-
holders' payoﬀ function as shown in Eq (5), the shareholders' equilibrium expected payoﬀ
can be calculated as:
pi∗s(m,
ρ
ha
) = c+m[m−2(
√
2−1)ρ/ha]
2[c−(3−2√2)(ρ/ha)2] .
As a result, we have:
d2 pi∗s (m,
ρ
ha
)
dmd ρ
ha
= −(5
√
2−7)(ρ/ha)2+(6−4
√
2)m·ρ/ha−(
√
2−1)c
[c−(3−2√2)(ρ/ha)2]2 .
Therefore, we can derive:
−d
2 pi∗s (m,
ρ
ha
)
dmd ρ
ha
> 0 if m < (
√
2−1)(ρ/ha)2+(
√
2+1)c
2ρ/ha
;
−d
2 pi∗s (m,
ρ
ha
)
dmd ρ
ha
< 0 if m > (
√
2−1)(ρ/ha)2+(
√
2+1)c
2ρ/ha
.
Proof of Proposition 5:
Proof. Taking the linear contract w1as the optimal contract given i and h, w
∗
1(h, i), we have
the shareholders' expected payoﬀ function as pis(k
∗
1, c
∗
1, h, i).
For a given level of h, the optimal investment for the shareholder, i∗(h) should satisfy
the ﬁrst order condition that:
∂ pis(k∗1 , c
∗
1, h, i)
∂ i
= 0 for i = i∗(h).
The impact of h on the above ﬁrst order condition is:
∂
∂ pis(k
∗
1 ,c
∗
1,h,i)
∂ i
∂ h
=
∂2 pis(k∗1 ,c
∗
1,h,i)
∂ i ∂ h
.
In the equilibrium, we have i = i∗and h = h∗ = h∗(i∗). h∗(i) is shown in Proposition 1.
As shown in the proof of Proposition 1, we have
∂ pis(k∗1 ,c
∗
1,h,i)
∂ h
= 0 if h = h∗(i) for any i. It
can be veriﬁed that
∂ h∗(i)
∂ i
= −
∂2 pis(k
∗
1 ,c
∗
1,h,i)
∂ i ∂ h
∂2 pis(k
∗
1 ,c
∗
1,h,i)
∂ h2
, where h = h∗(i).
The denominator of the above equation,
∂2 pis(k∗1 ,c
∗
1,h,i)
∂ h2
is negative for h = h∗(i). Therefore,
if h = h∗(i), we have ∂
2 pis(k∗1 ,c
∗
1,h,i)
∂ i ∂ h
∝ ∂ h∗(i)
∂ i
.
As derived in the proof of Corollary 1, ∂ h
∗(i)
∂ i
< 0. As a result,
∂2 pis(k∗1 ,c
∗
1,h,i)
∂ i ∂ h
< 0 for
i = i∗and h = h∗.
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